Abstract A wide range of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies has been proposed to address climate change. As most CDR strategies are unfamiliar to the public, it is unknown how increased media and policy attention on CDR might affect public sentiment about climate change. On the one hand, CDR poses a potential moral hazard: if people perceive that CDR solves climate change, they may be less likely to support efforts to reduce carbon emissions. On the other hand, the need for CDR may increase the perceived severity of climate change and, thus, increase support for other types of mitigation. Using an online survey of US adults (N = 984), we tested these competing hypotheses by exposing participants to information about different forms of CDR. We find that learning about certain CDR strategies indirectly reduces support for mitigation policies by reducing the perceived threat of climate change. This was found to be true for participants who read about CDR in general (without mention of specific strategies), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, or direct air capture. Furthermore, this risk compensation pattern was more pronounced among political conservatives than liberals-although in some cases, was partially offset by positive direct effects. Learning about
Introduction
Large-scale interventions aimed at addressing global climate change are increasingly at the center of scientific and policy debates. Carbon dioxide removal (CDR), the removal and storage of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere using biological or chemical processes , is one such emerging approach. A wide range of CDR strategies has been proposed, varying from biology-based approaches such as reforestation to emergent technologies like direct air capture and sequestration (National Research Council 2015) . While CDR strategies differ in terms of their deployment readiness, costs, and potential tradeoffs, they share a common goal of increasing negative emissions and achieving a net reduction in atmospheric CO 2 concentrations (van Vuuren et al. 2013) .
Policymakers, researchers, and the lay public have expressed concern, however, that further development of CDR strategies may create a sort of moral hazard: if people perceive the problem of climate change to have been solved, they may no longer feel the need to support carbon dioxide emissions reductions from fossil fuel use and agricultural processes (Keith 2013; Anderson and Peters 2016) . Given this growing interest in CDR, we investigated whether learning about CDR would reduce or augment public support for other types of climate mitigation action. Due to the political polarization surrounding climate change, we also tested whether political ideology moderated this relationship.
Types of CDR
While all CDR strategies seek to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, they employ different mechanisms for doing so. Some rely on natural processes while others call for advanced technologies that are still in the early stages of development. For example, 1 through reforestation and afforestation, a cumulative carbon sink is created in the biomass of trees and in forest soils (Lenton 2010) . Bioenergy plus carbon capture and storage utilizes fast-growing crops, grasses, and trees as both a continuous carbon sink and a potential source of energy when coupled with long-term geological storage (Smith and Torn 2013) . Direct air capture relies on chemical solutions housed in air capture facilities to absorb carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere and sequester it (Meadowcroft 2013) . The implications and potential risks associated with this wide range of CDR strategies can vary widely. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the public's response to CDR will vary greatly depending on which specific form of CDR is presented to them ).
Potential tradeoffs between CDR and other climate change mitigation
Research from insurance, public health, and public safety contexts has long suggested that interventions that ameliorate the potential negative outcomes of a risky behavior can create a perverse incentive to continue or increase engagement with the behavior (Baker 1996; Lin 2013) . The potential for moral hazard to occur in the context of climate change has led some researchers to study the competing hypotheses of risk compensation-which suggests that learning about new climate solutions will reduce climate risk perceptions and related support for or engagement with mitigation efforts-and risk salience (or reverse moral hazard)-which suggests that these new approaches will instead increase the salience of and concern for climate change and lead to increased support for mitigation measures (Preston 2013; Carrico et al. 2015) . Some of this work has emerged from research on environmental behavioral spillover: the effect of pro-environmental interventions on subsequent behaviors that were not targeted by the interventions (Truelove et al. 2014) . In that literature, initial pro-environmental behaviors have been shown to sometimes lead to positive spillover (increased likelihood of subsequent pro-environmental action) (e.g., Baca-Motes et al. 2012; Lanzini and Thøgersen 2014) . This pattern could be seen as roughly mapping onto the risk salience hypothesis. Yet, other research has found support for negative spillover (decreased support for proenvironmental behaviors following an initial action) (e.g., Truelove et al. 2016 ), a pattern in line with risk compensation.
With regard to climate change solutions, evidence for risk salience and risk compensation is mixed. On the risk salience side, learning about adaptation approaches to climate change seems to increase support for mitigation among certain groups (Evans et al. 2014; Carrico et al. 2015; Howell et al. 2016) . On the risk compensation side, members of the public sometimes worry about the potential for moral hazard in CDR (Corner and Pidgeon 2014) and related technologies (Wibeck et al. 2015) . Others have shown that overly optimistic messages about progress in reducing emissions can undermine support for mitigation (Hornsey and Fielding 2016) . Finally, some researchers have found that learning about climate solutions, i.e., solar radiation management, has no impact on individual mitigation efforts (Fairbrother 2016; Merk et al. 2016) .
Despite this growing body of literature, we know of no experimental studies that directly test the risk salience and risk compensation hypotheses with CDR. With this in mind, we developed a survey-based experiment to address the following research question: RQ1: Will learning about CDR decrease (in line with the risk compensation hypothesis) or increase (in line with the risk salience hypothesis) the perceived threat of climate change?
In addition, as threat has been positively linked with policy support (Hart et al. 2015) , we tested the following related hypothesis: H1: A higher perceived threat of climate change will be associated with greater support for mitigation policies.
Thus, threat may act as a mediator between learning about CDR and support for mitigation policies.
Political ideology and CDR
Given divergent views of climate change, we expect political ideology to be a major factor in people's reactions to CDR, especially among US residents. Democrats and liberals are more likely to believe that climate change is happening, be supportive of government intervention to address climate change, and more willing to take personal responsibility for it. Republicans and conservatives, on the other hand, are less likely to subscribe to the scientific consensus on climate change, more likely to resist government interventions and lifestyle changes to address the issue, and more likely to favor technological solutions over regulatory interventions (Feygina et al. 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2011; Leiserowitz et al. 2012; Campbell and Kay 2014; Kahan et al. 2015) . Liberals and conservatives may consequently respond in different ways to proposed climate change solutions. For example, prior beliefs about climate change (Howell et al. 2016 ) and political ideology (Carrico et al. 2015) have been shown to weakly moderate how individuals evaluate information about adaptation and mitigation. Whereas liberals and highly concerned individuals tend to respond equivalently to both types of information, non-liberals and those less concerned about climate change are more responsive to information that deviates from typical mitigation messages.
Given the results of these previous studies, we hypothesize the following:
H2: Political ideology will moderate the link between learning about CDR and mitigation policy support.
We also predict that political ideology will moderate effects linked to our proposed mediator (perceived threat of climate change). Specifically, we expect that for liberals, who tend to be highly concerned about climate change, learning about CDR may have little impact on climate change threat perceptions. Support for mitigation policies may, thus, remain stable. Alternatively, introducing information about CDR-a highly uncertain approach to climate change-may imply that the problem is worse than previously thought and therefore increase both the perceived threat of climate change and support for traditional emission reduction strategies. Because of the potential for ceiling effects among liberals, the observed increases may be small. A risk salience response is also possible among conservatives and, if found, would be expected to result in larger increases in perceived threat relative to liberals. However, a risk compensation response seems more plausible for conservatives; they may be especially receptive to information about a technological fix that further reduces the perceived threat of climate change. Based on these predictions, we propose the following hypothesis: H3: Political ideology will moderate the link between learning about CDR and the perceived threat of climate change.
Finally, looking to the link between the perceived threat of climate change and support for climate mitigation policies, previous research has found that threat perceptions increase policy support across the political spectrum but tend to increase policy support more for conservatives (Hart et al. 2015) . Hart et al. found that for individuals with low perceptions of climate change threat, a strong political divide exists such that liberals are much more supportive of climate mitigation policies than conservatives. However, as threat perceptions increase, this political polarization is attenuated: conservatives with high threat perceptions of climate change support policy interventions at levels similar to liberals with high threat perceptions. We therefore hypothesize H4: Political ideology will moderate the link between the threat of climate change and support for mitigation policies. In this case, we expect that threat will have a positive association with policy support and the effect will be stronger for conservatives than liberals.
The present study
We used a national online survey-based experiment to test a moderated mediation model where the perceived threat of climate change is proposed to mediate the relationship between learning about CDR technology and support for climate mitigation policies. Political ideology was included as a moderator. To examine whether these relationships hold true for different CDR strategies, we compared four messages about CDR, one including a general description of CDR (without reference to individual technologies) and three conditions that also included specific descriptions of a type of CDR technology: reforestation, bioenergy with carbon capture and sequestration, and direct air capture.
Method 2.1 Participants
Participants were 1114 US adults recruited via the online Qualtrics Survey Panel. Quotas were used to recruit a sample that roughly approximated the US census in terms of gender, age, and education level. Participants who failed an attention check (n = 130) were removed from the dataset.
2 The final sample (N = 984) was 54% male and 46% female with a mean age of 46 (SD = 15.75, range 18-83); a mean income of $42,500; and a mean education of BSome College.^Study participants who failed the attention check had lower income and education levels compared to those who passed the check; there were no other significant demographic differences.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of five vignettes (available in the Electronic supplementary material). The first condition was a control condition in which participants read about climate change but were not introduced to CDR. The second condition contained additional text that described the idea of CDR more broadly, but without mentioning specific types of CDR (GEN condition). The remaining conditions added a description of one of three specific CDR approaches: reforestation (REF condition), bioenergy plus carbon capture and sequestration (BECCS condition), or direct air capture and carbon capture and sequestration (DAC condition). The vignettes were immediately followed by questions to assess reading comprehension. A forced response format was used for all survey items to minimize missing data. However, participants were free to withdraw from the survey at any time.
Perceived threat of climate change All participants indicated the extent to which they believed that climate change posed a serious threat to BYou personally,^BPeople in your community,^BPeople in the US,^and BOther people around the world^(1 = not at all serious to 5 = extremely serious). Responses were averaged into a single index of climate change threat (M = 3.10, SD = 1.07, Cronbach's α = .94).
Support for climate change mitigation All participants then indicated the extent to which they supported or opposed eight climate change mitigation policies (1 = strongly oppose to 7 = strongly support). These actions were (1) BSign an international treaty to reduce emissions from the U.S. and other countries,^(2) BRequire car manufacturers to increase the fuel efficiency of their vehicles,^(3) BIncrease subsidies for renewable energy such as wind and solar power,^(4) BA per-gallon tax on gasoline and diesel, based on the amount of greenhouse gases emitted,^(5) BRequire appliance manufacturers to increase the efficiency of energyusing appliances,^(6) BEncourage individuals to use less energy in their home and vehicles,( 7) BReduce greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants,^and (8) BSet national targets to limit greenhouse gas emissions.^Responses to the eight climate mitigation policy questions were averaged into a single index of support (M = 5.44, SD = 1.18, α = .91).
Political ideology Finally, participants reported their overall political ideology (1 = very liberal to 7 = very conservative) (M = 3.94, SD = 1.59).
Analysis
The analysis was conducted using the SPSS PROCESS macro developed by Hayes (2013) . The macro uses an OLS regression path-analytical framework and provides bootstrapped point estimates and confidence intervals for indirect effects. This approach is considered superior to alternatives such as the Sobel test or causal steps approach (Hayes 2013) . Bootstrap estimates were calculated using 10,000 iterations and bias-corrected estimates.
Results

Effects of learning about CDR on perceived climate change threats and mitigation support
We first investigated if learning about CDR would decrease or increase the perceived threat of climate change (RQ1) and the effects of this threat on policy support (H1). To do so, we used PROCESS Model 4, controlling for age, gender, education, and political ideology. The model template is shown in Fig. 1a and the results in Table 1 . Looking first to the impact of condition on perceived threat (RQ1), the results reveal that compared to the control condition (where participants only read about climate change), participants in the GEN, BECCS, and DAC conditions all had a lower perceived threat of climate change. There was no difference in perceived threat for participants in the REF condition compared to the control condition. In turn, the perceived threat of climate change had a significant positive association with support for climate mitigation policies, supporting We therefore used PROCESS Model 15, 4 which allows political ideology to moderate the direct link between learning about the different forms of CDR and policy support (H2) and the link between threat and policy support (H4) (see Fig. 1b ). Supporting H2, the interaction between ideology and CDR condition on policy support was significant for the REF (p = .005) and DAC (p = .017) treatments. The GEN and BECCS conditions approached significance at p = .082 and p = .095, respectively (Table 2 ). In all cases, when controlling for threat perceptions, reading about CDR increased support for mitigation policies among conservatives (Table 3 ). This direct effect was not observed for liberals or moderates. In support of H4, political ideology moderated the link between threat and support for climate mitigation policy (Table 2 ). This interaction is illustrated in Fig. 2 ; as the perceived threat of climate change decreases, so does mitigation policy support, with the effect more pronounced for conservatives than liberals. Due to this interaction, as shown in Table 3 , the GEN, BECCS, and DAC conditions all had significant negative indirect effects on support for climate mitigation policies through the mediator of threat, and this effect was more pronounced for political conservatives. This indirect effect was not observed in the REF condition. Finally, when looking at the direct (b = 0.26, SE = 0.16) and indirect (b = −0.23, SE = 0.09) effects together, we see that the total (overall) effect of DAC on mitigation policy support among conservatives is close to zero.
Discussion
Carbon dioxide removal can be a moral hazard
Our results suggest that the deployment of large-scale carbon dioxide reduction technologiesincluding specific types of CDR technologies-may result in a form of moral hazard by way of reducing the perceived threat of climate change. These findings are in line with the risk compensation hypothesis. Specifically, in our unmoderated mediation analysis (Model 4), learning about CDR in general, bioenergy plus carbon capture and storage, and direct air capture all led to reduced perceptions of the threat of climate change, which, in turn, eroded support for climate change mitigation policies.
Contrary to our expectations, political ideology did not moderate the link between learning about CDR and climate threat (H3). While ideology is often found to moderate the effects of climate change framings and attitudes toward climate change (including Table 2 . Results for moderated-mediation (Hayes Model 15) analyses of effects of learning about CDR on mitigation support through perceived threat of climate change and at different levels of political ideology. Note: † p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 Table 2 . (continued) risk perceptions) (Hart and Nisbet 2012; Wolsko et al. 2016 ), this is not always the case. For example, in a recent study by Carrico et al. (2015) , political ideology had main effects on the perceived risk of climate change (in line with our results) but did not moderate the effect of learning about climate adaptation. Research by Kahan et al. (2015) suggests that the presence of an interaction may depend on the type of climate change solution presented. In their study, hierarchical and individualistic values (which are often associated with conservatism) were found to have strong, negative main effects on perceived risk. An interaction between hierarchical values and climate framing was only found for individuals who read a story about the need to further reduce carbon dioxide emissions targets-a solution that may lead to further political polarization because it threatens commerce and industry, which are generally highly valued by conservatives. In line with our results for H3, Kahan et al. found no interaction between values and exposure to information about geoengineering. According to their cultural cognition thesis, the topic of geoengineering may be less threatening to conservatives because the focus on human ingenuity aligns with their worldviews. Reading about CDR may have engendered a similar response among conservatives in our study. As a result, although liberals and conservatives had different baseline levels of climate change threat, they exhibited parallel risk compensation responses.
Direct Predictors of Perceived
In support of H4, however, we did find that the effect of risk compensation on policy support varies by political ideology. While decreased threat perceptions led to reduced support for mitigation policies across the political spectrum, these effects were especially pronounced among conservatives, particularly at low levels of perceived threat. Overall, our results provide evidence that learning about certain types of CDR may erode support for the very policies necessary to mitigate climate change by diminishing climate risk perceptions. This pattern is echoed in recent research showing that geoengineering information can inspire similar risk compensation, depending on how the information is framed (Raimi et al. under review) . The interaction between CDR condition and political ideology on mitigation policy support reveals that the pattern of response is even more nuanced among conservatives. When controlling for climate threat perceptions, conservatives who learned about reforestation and direct air capture significantly increased support for climate change mitigation policies; a similar-but non-significant-trend was observed for the other CDR conditions. Past research by Cohen et al. (2007) suggests that people may be more open to ideas that would otherwise threaten their ideological identity if identity-relevant beliefs are first affirmed. If, as Kahan et al.'s (2015) research suggests, CDR is perceived to align with conservatives' cultural worldviews, learning about CDR may lead them to make more concessions when it comes to supporting other mitigation policies. We note, however, that in all cases except reforestation, the positive direct effects were washed out by equal or stronger negative indirect effects (mediated by threat). Further research will be required to identify the exact mechanism(s) behind any such direct effects of CDR on policy support. For moderates and liberals, the conditional direct effects of CDR on policy support, controlling for threat, were not significant, suggesting that risk compensation is the primary response among these ideological groups. Integrated assessment models suggest that technological solutions such as CDR will only help to limit warming below 2°C if they are used in conjunction with (rather than in lieu of) other mitigation efforts to reduce emissions . Talking about CDR solutions with these segments may consequently undermine overall efforts to stop or slow the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. 
Reforestation did not result in a moral hazard effect
Our findings suggest that not all forms of CDR will result in moral hazard; the effects of learning about reforestation differed from the other CDR conditions. Further research will need to explore which aspects of reforestation make it less likely to influence climate risk perceptions and invoke a related risk compensatory reaction. One possibility is that reforestation has the lowest technical potential to remove CO 2 from the atmosphere. As participants in the REF condition were told, reforestation has the potential to remove only a modest amount of yearly anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions. In comparison, BECCS and DAC have the estimated potential to remove a much larger proportion of annual emissions. Thus, reforestation may not have been perceived as sufficiently impactful to change the perceived threat of climate change. Although those in the general CDR condition were not told the magnitude of potential emissions removed, participants in that condition may have assumed it to be high. This interpretation is in line with research showing that overly optimistic messages about climate progress can erode motivation to engage in mitigation (Hornsey and Fielding 2016). Our study suggests that it is not just optimism about what has already been achieved, but optimism about the future potential of CDR solutions that can undermine mitigation. Another possible explanation for the reforestation results concerns the familiarity and perceived naturalness of this approach. If reforestation is perceived as a natural (rather than technological) process, this approach may have been out of line with participants' expectations regarding technological solutions to climate change. We might therefore expect-as observed-that reading about this strategy would have little effect on perceived climate change threat and, indirectly, policy support. Further research is needed to determine whether different framings of reforestation, or participants' familiarity with and perceptions of forests as potential carbon sinks, might alter these results. However, these considerations should be weighed against the potential for reforestation, while not altering climate threat perceptions, to increase climate mitigation policy support among conservatives through a direct effect.
Limitations and future directions
While the present study sheds light about the impact of learning about CDR on mitigation support, there are several limitations to note. In particular, our CDR scenarios were presented in a controlled experimental environment, using a forced response format. The demographics of our study participants additionally suggests that they may have been more predisposed to pay attention to the experimental stimuli than would be expected from the general population and in a real-world setting. While these factors contributed to the internal validity of our study by making sure that participants actually received the assigned treatments, they may threaten the ecological validity of our study as many people devote little attention to climate change information in their day-to-day lives. Further research is needed to more fully explore these implications in terms of eliciting risk compensatory and risk salience-based responses in more realistic settings.
Furthermore, the experimental stimuli provided only brief overviews of each CDR strategy. Past research on risk perceptions also suggests that people tend to be more supportive of emergent technologies in the abstract (such as in a survey) than when confronted with detailed information in specific situations (such as a proposal for a nearby carbon capture and sequestration project) (Pidgeon and Demski 2012) . Consequently, participants in the present study may have been more accepting of the CDR strategies described than if details about the projected financial, social, and environmental costs had been included. For these reasons, the present results may represent an approximation of how the public may react to CDR upon first learning about it through mass media channels. More nuanced information about the potential risks and tradeoffs of specific strategies could ultimately temper these downstream effects of learning about CDR. Additional research is needed to understand how support or opposition to specific CDR strategies affects the relationship between perceived threat and mitigation policy support. This research would also benefit from the inclusion of a broader range of CDR strategies and climate mitigation options, with the latter allowing for an investigation into CDR's influence on support for measures that necessitate more or less effort on the part of the individual. Finally, given that CDR strategies vary along a range of familiar versus emerging technologies, research into the association between an individual's trust in technology, evaluation of the risks and benefits of CDR, and subsequent risk compensatory behaviors in the domain of climate change mitigation is also warranted.
Conclusion
In line with the risk compensation hypothesis, the results of this study suggest that learning about CDR can reduce the perceived risk of climate change; this effect was observed for all but one of the CDR technologies referred to in this study. In turn, a diminished perception of the threat of climate change was associated with reduced support for climate mitigation policies, and this effect was most pronounced for those with a conservative political orientation. These results indicate the need for caution in engaging the public on the topic of carbon dioxide removal strategies for fear of simultaneously diminishing climate risk perceptions, disincentivizing emissions reductions, or diverting resources from mitigation efforts (Lin 2013) . One way of avoiding moral hazard may be to more clearly articulate the uncertainties and tradeoffs of specific CDR approaches in order to facilitate more informed public deliberation-as opposed to superficial engagement-on the topic (Corner and Pidgeon 2010) . These results are tempered, however, by the observation of increased climate policy support among conservatives when looking at the direct effects of the REF and DAC conditions. Our study suggests that learning about some CDR approaches could help dampen opposition to other mitigation efforts.
